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RISKY R & D WITH RIVALRY
nvMoRroN1.KAMIIN ANt)NANCY L.SCIIWARTZ*
A firm's R & D plaiitiing problemis niode fled and tile' optimal spe'iuhng phiii acer the ih't elopinentperiod
cluiracterized.Bothtechnical uncertainty, through lackoffullinformation about requirements for success
in the RI), and market uncertainte, through unknown actionsof potential ruals. are tke'n into at ount.
The analysis may a!so he pertinent to a randyof problems inrolring resource allocation orer time.
Likewise', he inethodologr dereloped mahe useful for modelling and sohmg othe'r stochustrc optimal
control problems.
INTRODUCTION
A firm contemplating an R& D project faces uncertainties from withinand from
without. rhe effort required tocomplete the R & D,the magnitude of theinvention
obtained and its value are all uncertain atinception. If there are rivals seeking
the same goal. the firmobtains the rewards if it is the innovator,but may be pre-
empted and get less or nothingif there is prior claim by a rival. Finallythere is
uncertainty about the magnitudeof potential demand for the innovation.
The R & D manager must find a strategyfor pursuing development in the
face of these uncertainties. Wefocus upon two particular sourcesof uncertainty.
First, the magnitude of R & Deffort required for successful projectdevelopment is
not known. Second, thefirm does not know the researchplans of other firms
regarding projects closely related toits own. We shall refer to thefirst type of
partial ignorance astechnological uncertainty and to thesecond as market
uncertainty, a distinction alsoemployed by Hirshleifer [3], amongothers.
Optimal behavior under eachof these two types of uncertaintyhas been
discussed separately in earlierworks. In [4] we derived the time patternof optimal
planned R & D expenditureunder technological uncertainty,supposing no rivalry.
In [5, 6] we considered thespeed of development under thethreat of rivalry, with
no technologicaluncertainty. That is, the costof successful completion by any
given date was assumedknown, with more rapiddevelopment more costly.
Some of this work isreviewed by Gittens [2].
Our objective in this paperis to combine featuresof our previous efforts to
obtain a characterization of afirm's R & D expenditureplan in the face of both
technological and marketuncertainty. The stochasticfeatures of the underlying
technology are modelledthrough an assumedprobability function over the
amount of cumulative R& D effort requiredfor success. That is, whilethe total
effort required to complete theresearch satisfactorily is notknown, the probability
of project completion by anydate is a nondecreasingfunction of cumulated
research effort to that date.Effort is accumulatedthrough expenditure of money.
Funds alloted the project arespent in the mostefficient manner. We suppose
there are decreasing returns tothe compression of thedevelopment period.
* The research for this paper wassupported by a grant fromthe National ScienceFoundation.
The authors retain allresponsibility for views expressed.
267Uponthe successfulcompletionof the R & I), arewirdstream iS c011ectj
The valueof thestream niav bestochastic. hut itis aSSIllfle(lindependeof the
calendar date of coin pletion. However, ifa rival completes its R & Dand introijtic5
essentially the same product or processOurfIrm is seeking10develop, Ourfirm
can ohtiin nothing. Thusdevelopment expenditures are made onlyuntil son
fIrm succeeds at development, and rewards are collected by our firm onlyif it
is the successful firm. Potential rivals are recognizedthrougha single subjetI
probability distribution over the ifltroductlofl date of any Competingproduct or
process. The assumed objective is maximum present expected value of the
project
In the next section we present the formal model of the fIrm engaged inR & D
activity in the posited environment as an optimal control problem and
derive
necessary conditions for optimality. In the following section We characteriiethe
behavior of the firm's optimal expenditure plan through time and finda fleccssar
condition for the firm to undertake the R & I) project. The impact ofmarket
uncertainty on the optimal expenditure policy is examined in thesubsequent
sect ion. We summarize our results, pose sonic unresolved questions, and indicate
how technological uncertainty might generate market uncertainty iiithe final
sect ion.
Tiii Mo!)IL
Our model formulation is similar to that of [4].Weletni(t)ani :(t) denote
the rate of dollar spending on the project and cumulative "effort," respecti'ely
at time t. Cumulative effort grows with dollar spending in accordance witha
bounded, strictly concave, monotone increasing function g(m) withproperties
summarized by
(I) g(0)0, g'(0)< g(m)>0, g"(m)<0, g(nz) <B
for allmand some constant B<x
where prime denotes differentiation. Thus. by hypothesis,
z'(t)= g(in(t)),:(0) =0.
According to (1) and (2) there are decreasing returns to more rapid spendingon
the project, a supposition supported by Scherer's empirical studies;see [9] and
references therein. There is no initial cumulated effort (but relevant learning from
previous projects will he reflected in the function F introduced in thenext para-
graph). No growth of cumulative effort occurs without spending.
The level of cumulative effort needed for successful completion of the project
is not known. However the firm's beliefs about required efforts are manifest
through a cumulative probability distribution 1:), twice continuously differen-
tiable with properties
F(0)=0.J))0F'(:)O.limF(:)=l.
The function I may reflectany relevant experience gained from previous R & D
efforts. Conditions (3) express the assumptions thatpOSitive effort on the current
2ôf




as the instantaneous probability of successful completion given completion has
notyetoccurred. Roughly,h(:d: is the probability of projectcoiiipletion with
the increment ofetlort d: given that total effort(lid flOt bring the project to fruition.
Definition (4) can also be expressed as
F(:)I - exp
J-Ii(x) dx
on recollecting (3) for evaluation of the constant of integration The stipulation
that F(:) is a proper distribution implies that the integral on the right side he
divergent. This will be true if
h'(:) for:0.
We assume (5) holds. The intuitive meaning of (5) is that the firm's expectation
of successful completion with incremental effort rises as effort is accumulated.
The firm's uncertain beliefs about when a rival might successfully complete
a similar project are presented by the cumulative probability distribution P(t),
the assumed probability of rival introduction by time 1. We assume P is twice
continuously differentiable with
P(0)=0, P0')0, limP(t) 1.
We define, analogously to (4),
p0')P(t)(lP(t))
as the instantaneous conditional probability of rival preemption, or entry rate,
and suppose that
p'(t)0.
Thus the probability ofrival introduction at any time,given that it has not occurred
to date, does not diminish through time.
Unlike technological uncertainty, market uncertainty is exogenous to the
firm. in this model, the first firm to complete its R & D project captures the entire
marketforwhich the rivals were competing. We have considered in [5] the possi-
bility that latecomers can also profit. In that situation, the first firm to enterthe
market may attempt to retard further entry through its pricing policy: then
market uncertainty becomes partially endogenous. The more restrictive assump-
tions of this model facilitate the present analysis.
We suppose a finite tme horizon 1' for the firm's planning process.The firm
see1s maximum discounted expected value of all cash flowsassociated with the
R & D project. We now examine these expected cash flows.The expected reward
to the innovating firm upon success of the R & I),discounted to completioi time, is
R.This value R of the expected discounted stream of futurebenefits is ir.dependent
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ofcalendar time.The probability of recei'uig Rat 1.I.e.of protectcornplet ionat
11.= =El )'(llilcthe prohahWty that the reward is stillavailable
al timei(1 - PIt)). Prior toconipletiorior preefliptiOlLthe firmspends at the
rate n(t).Thus the firms seeks to
maximizec") 1 - P(t))[RL (:110:11)ui(1)( I - F(:(t))] di
subject to (2).wherei' represents a constafltdiscountrate.
It isimportant t te thatthisis a /)i(lfl?liflgmodel.That is. the firmseeks a
contingency developmentplan. The planned spending ?n(t) thatmaximizes(9)
subject to (2), willactuallyheexpendedonlySC)long as neither of therandon
events ''project completion' or "rval preemptionhaveoccurred. Further,an'
change in datawould necessitate a recomputatiOn oftheoptimal policy, employ.
ingthethen current situation as initial conditions.
itwill he convenient to rephrase theproblem slightly. We choose toviewg(m)
as thecontrol variable.1)eline
Ug(ni).
Since glut) is strictly monotone, the inverse g -exists. ('ailing this inverse f,
The properties of g(ni) summarized in (1) imply that
.1(0) =0. (u) >0./')u)>0.
The optimal control problem can he restated, therefore, on substituting from (2),
(10) and (1 l)as
maximizeje'( I- P(tfl[RF(lu/ (u) (I - F):))] di
subject to :(r) = u(t).u
where nIl) is the control variable and the cumulative effort cU) is the state.
Because ofthe monotonicityof g. or/.with in=0 if and only if u=0,there
is a direct relation between the behavior of the control 11(1)andthat of planned
spending ni(1).Consequently.we shallhenceforthdeal with problem(13}--(14)only
andrefer tobehaviorof u(t) asreflectingtheplannedspending pattern.
To obtain necessary conditions for solution of theoptimalcontrol problem
(I 3H14).weintroduce themultiplierfunction(t)and form the Hamiltonian
II=e "(1 - P(i))[Rf'(:)u - 1(u)) 1F):))] + ).0
fromwhichweobtain
I - P(z))[RE'(:) - J(u)( I - F(:))] + '
ui'I!i'u=0
=tI.i:=t,-"(l -P(IOIRF'u .fF'],)(T)=0
(II) g1(0) I (u).Since I" > 0,
i2Hu2 = - I-- P)( I - Ft' < 0
so a critical point of the Hamiltonian will be a maximum
Conditions ( 14)---( 17) describe the optimal expenditure planimplicitly One
plan that satisfies these conditions is that of not undertakingthe project at all. The
value of this plan is zero. The subsequent discussion will icusupon a plan that
does involve some positive spending: such a plan is called non-null. Thebest non-
null plan satisfying (l4)( 17) will be optimal if its value is positive. Otherwise,the
optimal plan is not to undertake the R & D project.
To obtain a more explicit characterization ofa non-null plan. we note
that throughout a time interval during which a is positive, iH?u= 0 is con-
stant. Therefore dfrHícu)/dt = 0 on that interval, i.e. from (15). (17). (14).(4)
and (7)
(H/u) = e"(l - P)(l - F)[(r + p)(Rh- 1') - /"a' + Ji(f'i, - ffl
=0
where all variables and suppressed arguments are evaluated at1.for each t at
which the optimal u(t) > 0. Planning is needed only for those times t at which the
reward may still be available (P < I) and at which the development may not yet
be complete (F < 1). Therefore subsequent discussion is based on, and relevant
for.
P(t) < 1,F(z) < 1.
Thus over a time interval of positive spending, the bracketed expression in 118)
must be zero:
f"u' = Ji(/''ii - f) - (r + p)(Rh - / ')when u(t) > 0.
This equation will play a central role in establishing the behavior of optimal non-
null spending through time.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SOLUTION
We shall now show that if the R & D project is undertaken, then, under the
foregoing assumptions, planned spending will be increasing through time. There-
fore actual spending will be increasing until completion, preemption. or horizon.
This characterization will be formalized as Proposition 1 and proved in a series of
steps. Then a necessary condition for the existence of a non-null optimal solution is
presented in Proposition 2.
Proposition I
In an optimal non-null expenditure plan for problem (13), subject to (l4),( 12).
(5), (8), planned spending increases through time.
Proof. All assertions in the proof pertain to a non-null spending plan obeying
the necessary conditions for optimality.
271Step 1.Evaluate (20) at= 0, recalling that :10) = 0,Ii(0)0:
(r -1pJ /> U at t = 0. which, by (12). implies ii(0) .> (1.Ulìtis Spendingmust he
increasing initially.
Su'p2. We show that iii an optimal nonnull program. u(I Cdfl changeSignat
most once. Suppose there is a timeat which u(10) > 0, U') t= U. Then, from (20),
Ii(f'ul)=(rp)(RJi I')attfl.
The lime rate of change of the right side of 20) is
Jiu(/ 'ii - I - (r + p)R) - p'(RJz - I')
= -/r'u(r-fp)f'.li - p'(R/i/ ') at r.using (21).
The left side of(21 (is positive, since / is strictly convex with /(0) = 0 and u((0) > 0.
Therefore, the right side of(21)is also positive, which in turn implies that expression
(22) is negative. This means the right side of (20) is decreasing at time t0. Hence
any non-null optimal policy u(t) is either increasing throughout or else is initially
increasing, peaks, and then falls.
Step 3. We show that either planned spending stops b time 1' or else it is
increasing at lIf u( TI > 0. then 71(T) en = 0 and 1') '1) < I, F(:(T)) < I. Thus,
from(15)and(17)().(T) = 0).
Rh(z(T)/'(u(7'))0 if u(T) > 0.
Use (23) in evaluating (20) at T.
/''u'=Ii(/'uf)>()atTifu(T)>0.
Thus ui TI > 0. Hence n(T) > 0 implies u'(T)> 0 as claimed.
Step 4 We show that if planned spending ceases prior to T. i.e. if there isa
0 < t < 1' such that nIt) = 0, then
(a) u'(t) = 0
(hI RJi(:(t)) = f'(0)
(c)u(t) = 0 for I T.




for 0t < t
for tt
Evaluate (20) at this t. recalling /(0)= 0:
f"(0)u'(t) = - U' + pIt I)[RIr(:(tfl - I '(0)].
Since u is required. the left-hand derivative nIt)0. which implies from (25)
R/r( :fl)) '(0).
Claim (b) will follow if strict inequalityis eliminated. i'o do this, we assume strict
inequality in (26), reach a contradiction, and thusestablish (h). Evaluate the left
equality in (18)




where I K t.in view of(14), (12). But if strict inequality holds in (26) then from (27),
(II!
citi:i
which in turnimplies,since t > 0, that i1H/ii < 0 br t SO=Tandu(t) =0,
t < '11 Hence ).'(ij=0, t But since, from (17), 2(T)=0, we conclude
that
2(i)=0.ttT.
Now we can evaluate (15)
=e-( I - P)( I - F) [RIi(:(t)f'(0)], t T.
This is positive by supposition (26) but must he nonpositive by necessary condition
(15). This contradiction indicates that supposition of strict inequality in (26) is in
error, and result (h) obtains.
Verification of (a), given that (h) has been shown, follows on evaluating (20) at
t : i"u'(t)=0 so u'(t)=0.
Finally to establish (c), we observe that (28) and (b) together imply TH/n=0
at u(t)=0, t Since H is strictly concave in u, it follows that the Hamil-
tonian attains its maximum at u0. ti <11
Step 5. We can now show that u'(t) > 0 for 0iT. It follows from the
conclusions of Steps 1-3 that in a non-null policy, either u'(t)> 0, 0 or
else u(T)=0. We now show that u(T)=0 cannot happen under our assumptions.
thus completing the proof of the Proposition.
If ii(T)=0 in a non-null policy, then (since u'(0) > 0 by Step1)11(1)must
attain its maximum at some timer0 and then decline to zero. At t0,(21) holds. The
left side of(21) is positive so the right side is also
RIi(;(t0)) - f'(u(10)) > 0.
On the other hand, sinceand Ii are nondecreasing functions of their arguments
and since f' is strictly increasing in u,
Rh(:(t0))J''(u(t0)) < Ri,(:( T)) - f'(u( T))0
where the right hand equality follows from Step 4. Since (29) and (30) are inconsist-
ent, the supposition ol'u(T)=Ois erroneous. We must have u'(t) > OforO
in a non-null optimal policy. q.e.ii.
We note that the assumption of a nondecreasing completion rate Ii):)played
an important role in the characterization of the non-nullpolicy. If ii(:) were to
become a decreasing function after some point, reflecting eventuallygrowing
pessimism regarding feasibility of success in the R & D effort, thenthe expenditure
in a non-null policy may well fail to increase through time.
Our analysis thus far has been based on the assumedexistence of a non-null
optimal policy. We now present a necessary condition for such apolicy to exist.
Proposition 2
A necessary condition for the existence of non-nulloptimal policy is
Sup Rh):) >
- 273Proof.Assume the contrary.Thenfor arbiiraivu0,
Rh):) < supRh) I '(O 1(u).
It foflows that Rh):)-1(u)0, which together with (20) impliesu'(i; > 0, 0< T. Hence u(T) > 0, so that
j'(u(T)) > ['(0)sup RJi(:)Rh((1'))
which contradicts (23). The contradict ion establishesthe Proposition
The necessary condition of Proposition 2 isnot sufficient for theoptiniI policy to henon-null,Nevertheless, it is easy to apply andso can provide acoarse
screen for proposed projects. The rewards must be sufficientlylarge, with prob-
ability of successful completion high, andcost of cumulating effort low,to warrant
further investigation. E.astly, the existence ofasolution to problem (13),subject to (14), (12), (5) and (8) can be establishedas in [4, Appendix].
MARKET UNCERTAINTY
An optimal non-null R & D spending plan fora firm facing both market and
technological uncertainty,as described in Proposition I. does not differ qualita-
tively (in the sense that u'(t) > 0 throughout) fromthat found earlier without
market uncertainty (P=p0: see also [4, Theorem Ia])or indeed with neither
type of uncertainty (P=p0. F=h0 for:z; see also Lucas [7, Lemma 2]).
Likewise, the necessary condition ofProposition 2 is independent ofmarket
uncertainy, since the function P doesnot enter. It remains to ascertain what
quantitative difference the presence of marketuncertainty has on the firm's optimal
R & D plan. While we cannot providea complete answer to this query,a partial response is possible.
Thus, we note that market uncertaintycan discourage the firm l'rom under-
taking an R & D project that would bepursued in the absence of rival threat.To
see this, one need only observe thata positive probability of rival entry Pdiminishes
the expected return associatedwith any plan u, 2: recall (13).More specifically,
imagine the following situation. Thebest non-null plan u, ;* for (13)could render
(13) nonpositive, so that the nullpolicy (do nothing) would be best.Next imagine
modifying the integral (13) by settingP0 and evaluating the modified integral
at the non-null policy u, 2* just found.This integral value will be larger:if it is positive, then the optimal valueof(13) without rivalry will clearlyhe positive and the project will be pursued.Thus the market uncertaintycan dissuade the firm
from undertaking desirable R& D. On the other hand, itfollows from Proposition 1, that rivalry willnot induce the firm to terminatean accepted R & D project
prematurely, i.e. before completionby the firm or some rival.
Before proceeding toProposition 3. we observe that ifV(:.i)denotes
max f e -I - P)1F'z- 1(1 - F)] di
st. (14)andz(z)=
then 2(t0)=aV/c7z0. That iS,2(i)measures the marginal coitrihtition of thestate:
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Pto the maximum achievable from thattime forward: see Arrow 11]. An increnient in
cumulated effortcannot he detrimental under our hypotheses, so that ,(t)0,
U tT. Since, from Proposition 1, (15) holds with equality in anon-nullpohcy.
it follows that
(31) Rh(z) - f'(u)0, 0iT
in an optimal non-null plan, with strictinequality prior to T as long as (19) is
true.
Proposition 3
Let two firms he identical in every respect exceptthat the second firm antici-
pates potential rivals (P while the first does not (P0). At time zero, both
face problem (13), subject to (14),(12), (5), (8). If both firms have optimalnon-null
expenditure plans, then their respective paths intersectat most once in (u, z)-space.
Further, if an intersection (fl,) exists, it will be reached at alater dale by the
second firm than by the first.
Proof. Suppose the i-th firmreaches an assumed intersection (ü,) at time
t1 < T. Evaluate (20) forthe i-tb firm at r. Subtract the firstsuch equation from the
second to obtain
(32) f"(ü) [u'(12) -u'(f )]= -p(t2) [Rh() - J'(ü)]
where u1 is the optimal policyfor firm I. In view of(31). (32)implies
u'2(2)>u1(t1).
The slope of the path followedin (u, z) plane is dujdz= u'/z' =u'/u. Since u1(t)=
the slope du/dz of the secondfirm's path in the (u, z) plane at (ü,) exceeds the first
firm's. Because the relation of theslopes at any intersectionwould have to be that
just shown, the paths can cross atmost once.
Eliminating the parameter t, we canview the paths in the (u, z)plane as
graphs of functions U(z). Then
1_I< IT I.. . ., L2Z) as
Since at values ofz<, thesecond firm is spending at a lowerrate than the first, it
will achieve cumulated effortat a later date than thefirst firm. q.e.d.
According to Proposition 3,market uncertainty maymodify the optimal
spending path by retardingspending in early stages of the R& D and accelerating
spending in later stages, relativeto the expenditure patternprevailing in its
absence. This conclusionis based on the suppositionthat the two paths do cross, a
supposition that we have beenunable to verily or deny atthis time. The conclusions
of Proposition 3 do obtainunder somewhat weakerrestrictions, for example, that
max1 p1(t)mm, p(t).
SUMMARYAND FURTHERQUESTIONS
Wehave attempted toanalyze the optimalexpenditure plan for an R &D
project by a firm facedwith market uncertainty(through actions ofpotential
rivals) and technologicaluncertainty (through lackof perfect information about
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